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GAO Covert Tests: ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini and Grok Gave Viable Attack Plans

The Government Accountability Office reported on November 18 that in covert tests in spring 2026, ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini and Grok each produced information that could help a malicious actor plan and carry out an attack, after investigators bypassed the platforms' safeguards with common techniques. Each platform first refused, removed information or suspended accounts; each took under 12 hours; GAO had experts verify the plans were viable. GAO anonymised the platforms, withheld its techniques, made no recommendations and says the results are a point-in-time check, not a statistically significant sample. The companies said they will keep improving safety.

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A congressional auditor has put the safeguard debate on a federal record. In covert tests in spring 2026, investigators from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) got ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini and Grok each to produce information that GAO says could help a malicious actor plan and carry out an attack, according to report GAO-27-108814, published on November 18. Every platform's safeguards fired first. Every one was bypassed anyway.

What GAO did and found#

GAO picked the four most-used generative AI platforms as of April 2026 by usage statistics, the report says, and randomly assigned each to one of two scenarios chosen with experts: a mass-casualty bombing and an attack on the electrical grid meant to cause economic harm. Two platforms produced information for the first scenario and two for the second, including specific targets, locations and, in most cases, timing.

In each case, the prompts first triggered safeguards: refusals, removal of information or account suspensions. GAO says it got around them using "common safeguard-bypassing techniques," and that each platform took less than 12 hours to produce a plan, though that time could vary with the topic and the user's experience. Investigators then verified the plans' viability through research, surveillance and interviews with experts.

"We got the nefarious information that we were after. So, in this case, those safeguards didn't work," Kevin Walsh, a GAO director of IT and cybersecurity, said in a podcast published with the report, Nextgov/FCW reported.

What GAO did not do#

GAO does not say which platform produced which result, and it withheld the specific models and bypass techniques so the tests cannot be recreated, Nextgov reports. It made no recommendations, because the work examined commercial products rather than federal agencies, and it describes the results as a point-in-time assessment rather than "a statistically significant sample." Officials from the four companies "generally stated that their companies will continue to improve the safety of their platforms," the report says.

Senator Maggie Hassan, who requested the work and is set to chair the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee next Congress, said AI safety legislation will be an early priority, including possibly requiring more rigorous safety testing before models are released, Nextgov reported.

The finding sits alongside other outside tests of misuse. On November 17, evaluator Vals reported that frontier models marked civilian sites as targets when told the task was a game. Both were done by outsiders with limited samples, and neither tells us how often real attackers succeed.

Limits#

  • Four platforms, two scenarios and one test each: GAO itself says the sample is not statistically significant, and the platforms are anonymised.
  • The tests ran in spring 2026; the models and safeguards have changed since, and GAO did not retest.
  • We read GAO's summary through LegiStorm's copy, because gao.gov did not load for us, and the full report was not read.
  • We do not describe the attack plans or bypass methods.

Sources#

Prior Coverage

Earlier Times of AI reporting on this thread.

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